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President Outlines U.S. Policy For Southeast Asia

(Following is the official text of President Nixon's address April 20 at San Clemente, Calif., as released by the White House.)

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

I have requested this television and radio time to give you a progress report on our plan to bring a just peace to Vietnam.

When I first outlined our program last June, I stated that the rate of American withdrawals from Vietnam would depend on three criteria—progress in the training of the South Vietnamese, progress in the Paris negotiations, and the level of enemy activity.

Tonight I am pleased to report that progress in training and equipping South Vietnamese forces has substantially exceeded our original expectations last June.

Very significant advances have also been made in pacification.

Although we recognize that problems remain, these are encouraging trends.

However, I must report with regret that no progress has taken place on the negotiating front. The enemy still demands that we unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all American forces, that in the process we overthrow the elected government of South Vietnam and that the United States accept a political settlement that would have the practical consequence of the forcible imposition of a Communist government upon the people of South Vietnam.

'My responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces is for the safety of our men, and I shall meet that responsibility.'

That would mean humiliation and defeat for the United States. This we cannot and will not accept.

Let me turn now to the third criteria for troop withdraw-

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VISITS PENTAGON—President Nixon waves to employes as he enters the Pentagon accompanied by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. During his April 10 visit President Nixon met with military and civilian officials.

NEW CHAIRMAN OF JCS—After notification of his nomination by President Nixon to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, succeeding General Earle G. Wheeler, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer (left) met with other officials at the Pentagon. Others from left: Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, General Wheeler, Secretary of the Navy John Chafee, and Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., successor to Admiral Moorer as Chief of Naval Operations. (Department of Defense Photos)

President Outlines U.S. Policy For Southeast Asia

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als—the level of enemy activity. In several areas since December, that level has substantially increased.

In recent months Hanoi has sent thousands more of their soldiers to launch new offensives in neutral Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 to which they were signatories.

South of Laos, almost 40,000 Communist troops are now conducting overt aggression against Cambodia, a small neutralist country that the Communists have used for years as a base for attacks upon South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 to which they were also signatories.

This follows the consistent pattern of North Vietnamese aggression in Indochina. During the past eight years they have sent tens of thousands of troops into all three countries of the peninsula and across every single common border.

Men and supplies continue to pour down the Ho Chi Minh trail; and in the past two weeks, the Communists have stepped up their attacks upon allied forces in South Vietnam.

However, despite this new enemy activity, there has been an over-all decline in enemy force levels in South Vietnam since December.

As the enemy force levels have declined and as the South Vietnamese have assumed more of the burden of battle, American casualties have declined.

I am glad to be able to report tonight that in the first three months of 1970 the number of Americans killed in action dropped to the lowest first quarter level in five years.

In June, a year ago, when we began troop withdrawals, we did so on a "cut and try" basis—with no certainty that the program would be successful. In June we announced withdrawal of 25,000 American troops; in September another 35,000 and then in December 50,000 more. These withdrawals have now been completed and as of April 15, a total of 115,500 men have returned home from Vietnam.

'We have now reached a point where we can confidently move from a period of "cut and try" to a longer-range program for the replacement of Americans by South Vietnamese troops.'

We have now reached a point where we can confidently move from a period of "cut and try" to a longer-range program for the replacement of Americans by South Vietnamese troops.

Additional Troop Withdrawal

I am, therefore, tonight announcing plans for the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops to be completed during the spring of next year. This will bring a total reduction of 265,500 men in our Armed Forces in Vietnam below the level that existed when we took office 15 months ago.

The timing and pace of these new withdrawals within the over-all schedule will be determined by our best judgment of the current military and diplomatic situation.

This far-reaching decision was made after consultation with our commanders in the field and it has the approval of the Government of South Vietnam.

Now viewed against the enemy's escalation in Laos and Cambodia, and in view of the stepped-up attacks this month in South Vietnam, this decision clearly involves some risks.

But I again remind the leaders of North Vietnam that while we are taking these risks for peace, they will be taking grave risks should they attempt to use the occasion to jeopardize the security of our remaining forces in Vietnam by increased military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia, or in Laos.

I repeat what I said November 3rd and December 15th. If I conclude increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

My responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces is for the safety of our men, and I shall meet that responsibility. The decision I have announced tonight to withdraw 150,000 more men over the next year is based entirely on the progress of our Vietnamization program.

There is a better, shorter path to peace—through negotiations. We shall withdraw more than 150,000 over the next year if we make progress on the negotiating front.

Had the other side responded positively at Paris to our offer of May 14 last year, most American and foreign troops would have left South Vietnam by now.

A political settlement is the heart of the matter. That is what the fighting in Indochina has been about for the past 30 years.

We have noted with interest the recent statement by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik concerning a possible new Geneva Conference on Indochina.

We do not yet know the full implications of this statement. It is in the spirit of the letters I wrote on April 7 to signatories of the 1962 Geneva Accords urging consultations and observance of the Accords. We have consistently said we were willing to explore any reasonable path to peace. We are in the process of exploring this one.

Principles

Let me briefly review for you the principles that govern our view of a just political settlement.

First, our overriding objective is a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people and allows them to determine their future without outside interference.

I again reaffirm this Government's acceptance of eventual, total withdrawal of American troops. In turn, we must see the permanent withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops and be given reasonable assurances they will not return.

Second, a fair political solution should reflect the existing

relationship of political forces within South Vietnam. We recognize the complexity of shaping machinery that would fairly apportion political power in South Vietnam. We are flexible; we have offered nothing on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

And third, we will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon. President Thieu and I have repeatedly stated our willingness to accept the free decision of the South Vietnamese people. But we will not agree to the arrogant demand that the elected leaders of the government of Vietnam be overthrown before real negotiations begin.

Let me briefly review the record of our effort to end the war in Vietnam through negotiations.

We were told repeatedly in the past that our adversaries would negotiate seriously—

—*if only we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam*

—*if only we began withdrawing our forces from South Vietnam*

—*if only we dealt with the National Liberation Front as one of the parties to the negotiations*

—*if only we would agree in principle to remove all our forces from Vietnam.*

We have taken all these steps.

The United States, over a year and a half ago, halted all bombing of North Vietnam. Long ago we agreed to negotiate with the National Liberation Front as one of the parties. We have already withdrawn 115,500 American troops. Tonight I have announced a decision to reduce American force levels by a quarter of a million men from what they were 15 months ago. We have offered repeatedly to withdraw all of our troops if the North Vietnamese would withdraw theirs. We have taken risks for peace that every fair and objective man can readily recognize.

Still there is no progress at the negotiating table.

It is Hanoi and Hanoi alone, that stands today blocking the path to a just peace for all the peoples of Southeast Asia.

When our astronauts returned safely to earth last Friday, the whole world rejoiced with us. We could have had no more eloquent demonstration of a profound truth—that the greatest force working for peace in the world today is the fact that men and women everywhere regardless of differences in race, religion, nationality, or political philosophy, value the life of a human being. We were as one as we thought of those brave men, their wives, their children, their parents.

The death of a single man in war, whether he is an American, a South Vietnamese, Viet Cong, or a North Vietnamese, is a human tragedy. That is why we want to end this war and achieve a just peace. We call upon our adversaries to join us in working at the conference table toward that goal.

No Presidential statement on Vietnam would be complete without an expression of our concern for the fate of the American prisoners of war.

The callous exploitation of the anxieties and anguish of the parents, the wives and the children of these brave men, as negotiating pawns, is an unforgivable breach of the elementary rules of conduct between civilized nations. We shall continue to make every possible effort to get Hanoi to provide information on the whereabouts of all prisoners; to allow them to communicate with their families; to permit inspection of prisoners of war camps; and to provide for the early release of at least the sick and the wounded.

My fellow Americans, five years ago American combat troops were first sent to Vietnam. The war since that time has been the longest and one of the most costly and difficult conflicts in our history.

The decision I have announced tonight means that we finally have in sight the just peace we are seeking. We can now say with confidence that pacification is succeeding. We can now say with confidence that the South Vietnamese can develop the capability for their own defense. And we can say with confidence that all American combat forces can and will be withdrawn.

Dedication and Bravery

I could not make these statements tonight had it not been for the dedication, bravery and sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of young men who have served in Vietnam. Nor could I have made it had it not been for the perseverence of millions of Americans at home.

When men write the history of this nation they will record that no people in the annals of time made greater sacrifices in a more selfless cause that the American people sacrificed for the right of 18 million people in a faraway land to avoid the imposition of Communist rule against their will and for the right of these people to determine their own future free of any outside interference.

The enemy has failed to win the war in Vietnam because of three basic errors in their strategy.

They thought they could win a military victory. They have failed to do so.

They thought they could win politically in South Vietnam. They have failed to do so.

They thought they could win politically in the United States. This proved to be their most fatal miscalculation.

In this great, free country of ours, we debate—we disagree, sometimes violently, but the mistake the totalitarians make over and over again, is to conclude that debate in a free country is proof of weakness. We are not a weak people. We are a strong people. America has never been defeated in the proud 190-year history of this country, and we shall not be defeated in Vietnam.

Tonight I want to thank the American people for the support which you have given so generously to the cause of a just peace in Vietnam.

It is your steadiness and your stamina that the leaders of North Vietnam are watching tonight. It is these qualities, as much as any proposals, that will bring them to negotiate.

It is America's resolve, as well as America's reasonableness, that will achieve our goal of a just peace in Vietnam and strengthen the foundations of a just and lasting peace in the Pacific and throughout the world.

Thank you and good night.

Continuing Need For United States Forces In Europe

By Secretary of the Army
Stanley R. Resor

(This is the second of a two-part series from a speech by Secretary Resor to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council April 10.)

To those who argue that NATO's conventional forces are not strong enough to defeat the Warsaw Pact, and therefore do not constitute a real deterrent, there are two answers:

First, this view results partly from a misreading of the relative military strengths in Europe.

Second, it fails to understand what level of force suffices for deterrence.

First, as to strengths. The appraisal cannot be made simply by counting divisions, or tactical aircraft, or riflemen. NATO divisions, for instance, average about 50 per cent larger—United States divisions 60 per cent to 80 per cent larger—than those of the Warsaw Pact. NATO combat forces have more supporting elements, for more staying power. The Institute for Strategic Studies, an independent analytical group in London, estimates that the NATO forces are fully two-thirds to size of the Warsaw Pact's in manpower, without attempting to measure qualitative differences. In addition, both we and our NATO allies have other forces not counted in NATO, but many of which could be committed to it in an emergency.

Secondly, a somewhat smaller force can inhibit potential military actions of a larger one. It has the considerable military advantage of being in a defensive position. More importantly, the purpose of our ground forces in Europe is simply to maintain stability. To attain that objective, they need only be large and capable enough to make unattractive to the Warsaw Pact nations the use or threat of force to change the balance of power in Europe.

Tailored Conventional Forces

This does not mean that NATO must be prepared to defeat the Warsaw Pact with conventional forces if the latter chooses to launch an all-out attack following concealed and extensive preparations. We have tailored our conventional forces to be strong enough to deal with lesser threats including miscalculations by the Warsaw Pact of NATO resolve and capability. They need only be sufficient to introduce in the minds of Soviet military planners an uncertainty, a realization that aggressive actions against Western Europe would not be free from cost, and that the outcome of such actions could not be predicted with assurance.

The size, composition and capabilities of the land forces the United States currently has committed or oriented toward NATO are under continuous review and adjustment. There are some recognized deficiencies, and in most cases programs are under way to remedy them. Some changes in organization and reduction of personnel may be possible. We are currently

Secretary Resor

streamlining and reducing our headquarters and administrative and logistic forces. But a substantial reduction in combat personnel could not be made without measurably altering the total NATO capability. As things stand today, we expect that NATO can, with approximately its current military manpower levels and with qualitative improvements in equipment and readiness mount a sufficient defense to make Warsaw Pact leaders doubt that they would gain significantly from threatened or actual use of force.

For these reasons, I cannot agree with those who argue that a substantial conventional capability in Western Europe is not necessary.

Turning now to the question of costs. There are critics who admit the importance of conventional forces to NATO. They contend, however, that at the present levels the United States bears an unfair proportion of the costs, or that our contribution to NATO is more than we can afford, given our substantial domestic needs. We should do less, these arguments sometimes run, in order to force our Allies to do more.

It is, of course, true that the United States faces urgent domestic problems, the solution of which will cost money. At the same time, the Federal Government must take steps to end inflation and restore balance within the economy. These

factors combine to force some substantial reduction in Defense expenditures.

I am sure you all recognize that we have already taken steps in precisely this direction. Progress in Vietnamization (a component of the President's program for peace) has permitted substantial troop withdrawals in Vietnam. Greater reliance on our Asian Allies to provide the manpower necessary to their own defense has caused changes in our strategic objectives, permitting still further reduction in our own Defense expenditures. In spite of pay raises, the Defense Budget has been reduced by $6.9 billion from Fiscal Years 1969 to 1971.

Consequently, our total Defense expenditures for Fiscal Year 1971 will constitute only seven per cent of the Gross National Product. This is the lowest expenditure on defense since 1951, measured either as a fraction of the Gross National Product or as a fraction of the Federal Budget. And this is so at a time when direct expenditures for the conflict in Vietnam are still large, representing more than 20 per cent of total Defense expenditures in the current fiscal year.

In allocating a reduced Defense Budget, it is particularly important that we put first things first. Even while asking our allies to do more, we must recognize the importance of both the conventional and strategic nuclear components of our NATO forces. We must allocate Defense resources prudently, in order to provide for these essential elements of our security, even if this means less funding for other Defense programs.

Three Different Costs

The savings from withdrawing our troops from Western Europe would not be great. In fact, there might be no savings at all. To understand why this is so, one must distinguish three different kinds of costs that result from our contribution to the defense of Western Europe.

The first is the direct cost of maintaining inbeing all the forces which are committed to NATO, wherever they are located. These costs have been estimated at $14 billion, or roughly 20 per cent of our total Defense expenditures. Most of the amount—$11.4 billion—is associated with the maintenance of additional forces in the United States ready to support and reinforce those deployed in Europe. The remaining $2.6 billion which is the operating cost of the troops in Europe would not be saved by withdrawing those forces to the United States, unless they were in addition inactivated.

But the present balance in military capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as considerations of the necessary size for the nation's ground forces as a whole, would not permit this. Many who argue that we should reduce our deployments in Europe nevertheless agree that we must maintain these forces ready to reinforce our NATO Allies in times of crisis.

A second, distinguishable kind of cost would be the incremental expense of locating our troops in Europe rather than maintaining the same forces in the United States. Yet the additional cost of our forward deployments is very small. In fact, in the short run, shifting these troops to the United States would require extra expenditures because we would have to provide facilities in this country to replace those which the German government now provides.

Balance Of Payments

The third kind of cost associated with our European deployments is the adverse effect on our international balance of payments. The gold flow associated with our presence in Europe can be an economic problem even though the budgetary cost is supportable. In the past, these costs have been substantially offset by Allied purchases of United States military equipment and securities. It is obviously desirable that arrangements be maintained and improved to offset substantially these balance of payments problems. And we should press for this. But it should be possible without substantial reductions in our deployed forces.

In any case, we can depend only to a limited degree on strategic movement of land forces from the United States to Europe to meet an initial enemy attack. And in a time of political tension we might be reluctant to increase that tension by large reinforcements when there had been no actual hostilities. On the other hand, the time required to prepare United States-based forces for deployment, transport them to Europe, and move them to their designated combat positions, would keep them from being available to NATO in the critical first days of combat.

Finally, proponents of substantial unilateral withdrawal

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ABOARD USS AMERICA—Air Force Brigadier General Vernon R. Turner (center), Director of Aircraft and Missiles with the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) views a Navy A7E Corsair II during a recent orientation visit aboard the attack carrier USS America at sea. Briefing Brig. Gen. Turner are Commander Wayne A. Stevens (left), Commanding Officer of Attack Squadron 146, and Commander Don Duhrkopf, Commanding Officer of Attack Squadron 147. These are the first fleet operational squadrons to fly the Navy's newest attack aircraft.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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from Europe raise an issue of equity in sharing of the total NATO defense. Europeans, they say, should shoulder more of the burden. It is of course true that Western Europe enjoys a prosperous and healthy economy. But it is doubtful that this is a practical suggestion if it contemplates substitution of European troops for United States forces.

In the first place, such a change would take from three to five years to accomplish. More importantly, not all our allies are equally capable of shouldering an increased military burden at this time. Great Britain, for instance, is only now recovering from a major economic crisis. The only country which could make up the deficit of our divisions is West Germany. But an expanded German force would alter the multi-national balance of NATO and change international power relationships on the Continent. The result almost surely would be less stability between East and West, and possibly within the Alliance itself.

Furthermore, even though European Defense expenditures as a fraction of GNP have been and remain lower than our own, it is also true that our Allies have made and continue to make a significant and substantial contribution to collective defense. They presently supply 80 per cent of NATO forces. Obviously if their economies continue to grow they will be able to afford some increase in their Defense expenditures. Since the adoption in 1967 of the NATO strategy of flexible response, most of our West European Allies have adopted general plans that imply some increase in their Defense expenditures.

Can Do More

There are, of course, areas in which the Europeans can do more to help. I have mentioned the balance of payments. Another is modernization and improvement of their present forces, which they already have undertaken. In addition, Europeans may be able to take over some support functions which Americans now perform.

To those who would argue that it is up to the Europeans to defend Europe, and their own problem if they do not, I would reply that the defense of Europe involves directly the security of the United States itself. We are not working to keep Western Europe free simply out of altruism. Where our own interests are involved, it is up to us to make an independent assessment and act accordingly.

We certainly cannot make the simple assumption that Europeans would automatically feel impelled to replace any forces which we withdrew. Instead of spurring them to greater efforts, a substantial American withdrawal would very likely have the opposite effect. The Europeans could not by themselves restore NATO to its current strength for several years; and seeing it weakened below the level of effective deterrence, they might well abandon further efforts to maintain a credible conventional deterrent.

The most encouraging reason for maintaining our military strength in Europe, however, is the one I mentioned at the beginning of this talk. There is now a general balance of military power strategically between the United States and the Soviet Union, and tactically NATO has adequate forces to maintain a credible deterrent. On both sides there is a desire to lessen Defense expenditures to the extent national security will permit.

Turning Point

We appear to be at a turning point in European history. Whatever settlement is reached will take into account the military realities. It would be a great misfortune to abandon our Allies, leaving them weakened, to reach a political settlement on Soviet terms, when a continued military balance can help achieve a political arrangement consistent with our own security and fair to all concerned.

Former Ambassador Kennan recently observed that the Soviets would pay a high price to get United States forces out of Western Europe, and that they should be made to do so. A mutual reduction of forces would be a great step towards lasting peace. A unilateral reduction would be likely instead to decrease stability. With mutual force reductions one of the most promising areas for East-West negotiations, this is not the time for us to act unilaterally.

We must be mature enough to realize that peace has its costs; but they are as nothing compared with the costs of war. The ultimate answer must lie in mutual reductions of forces. In that direction lies the only safe road to peace and a lessening of world tensions. Keeping our forces in Europe will put us closer to that goal. And until that goal is achieved, a strong conventional force in Europe remains our soundest investment in national security. It is also the best hope of maintaining the conditions of peace upon which attainment of all our other goals, at home and abroad, depends.

MEETING ABOARD USS FORRESTAL—Rear Admiral William H. House (left), Commander of Carrier Division Four and Rear Admiral George C. Talley Jr., who relieved Rear Adm. House April 10, conferred with three key admirals aboard the Forrestal early this month. They are (center to right) Admiral Horacio Rivero Jr., Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe; Vice Admiral David C. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet; and Rear Admiral George L. Cassell, Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe. The Forrestal, commanded by Captain Charles F. Demmler, is with the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

Prisoners Of War, Missing In Action

Plight Of 1,500 U.S. Servicemen Concerns Officials

By Richard G. Capen Jr.
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

(A member of the Department of Defense Prisoner of War Policy Committee, Mr. Capen has informed members of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (Washington Chapter) about the concern of officials regarding the plight of 1,500 U.S. servicemen who are prisoners of war or missing in action. Here are excerpts of his April 2 speech.)

While there are many Defense subjects which I could discuss today, none is more important than the plight of our 1,500 U.S. servicemen who are prisoners of war or missing in action.

There have been thousands of brave Americans killed in Vietnam and certainly we are indebted for their ultimate sacrifices. We also are indebted to the hundreds of missing and captured servicemen—and they represent a group we can do something about. In fact, I believe we have a responsibility to assist these prisoners and their families.

The gravity of this problem is readily apparent from a few basic statistics. Currently, only about 430 have been identified as prisoners of war. The remaining, more than 1,000 men, are missing in action. Some have been missing for more than five years.

Mr. Capen

More than 450 of these men have been missing or captured three and a half or more years, which is longer than any U.S. serviceman was ever held prisoner during all of World War II.

Some of these men have been used for propaganda broadcasts and photographs. Some have been tortured. Others have been held in isolation for months at a time. At least 19 have been murdered by their captors or allowed to die. Most have never been allowed to write or receive letters. Many have been denied proper medical treatment and adequate diets.

Secretary Laird and the Defense Department feel an important obligation to these men. We are determined that they will not be forgotten and will pursue this issue relentlessly until all prisoners are released and our missing men are accounted for.

We have made a special effort to present the facts about these men before the arena of world opinion. We have done so in the belief that world opinion deplores inhumane treatment of prisoners, it deplores the attitude of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong who consistently ignore minimum humanitarian standards of prisoner treatment.

Today there are several thousand wives, parents, and children who do not even know whether their loved ones are dead or alive. Not only has the enemy refused to identify the men they hold, but also they have refused even to identify the men who have died during capture or captivity.

The United States and responsible leaders around the world have urged time and time again that the enemy release the sick and injured, that the enemy should permit impartial inspections, that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong should identify those whom they hold and that they should permit the prisoners to write and receive letters.

I personally have crisscrossed the United States to meet with more than 1,800 wives and parents of these men. I know of their personal courage. I know of their patriotic dedication and their personal faith.

In recent weeks, several so-called peace representatives have brought out letters and names of men held prisoners in North Vietnam. Frankly, I do not believe these peace representatives are all that anxious to be involved in the prisoner problem. They claim the North Vietnamese are great humanitarians but they are somewhat embarrassed when asked to explain Hanoi's cruel and inhumane treatment of our men.

These groups have initiated no significant moves to resolve the prisoner question. Rather, they have been used by Hanoi for purely propaganda purposes.

Despite any impression to the contrary, there has been little progress in recent weeks on the prisoner question.

For example, much attention has been given to a peace activist who has reported that letters were on the way from Hanoi to prisoner families. Such mail has been en route from North Vietnam since mid-January but not one letter has

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Statement By President Nixon

(April 20, 1970)

No Presidential statement on Vietnam would be complete without an expression of our concern for the fate of the American prisoners of war.

The callous exploitation of the anxieties and anguish of the parents, the wives and children of these brave men, as negotiating pawns, is an unforgivable breach of the elementary rules of conduct between civilized nations. We shall continue to make every possible effort to get Hanoi to provide information on the whereabouts of all prisoners; to allow them to communicate with their families; to permit inspection of prisoners of war camps; and to provide for the early release of at least the sick and the wounded.

Plight Of 1,500 U.S. Servicemen Concerns Officials

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yet been received by a wife or parent here at home.

The enemy's continued use of the irregular channels for letters and information on our men is a transparent, cruel effort to extract political gain from the misery and anguish of the families of our missing and captured men. No one should be fooled by this propaganda effort. Six months ago, four prisoner of war wives visited Paris; more than a hundred others followed shortly thereafter. All received promises that the North Vietnamese would identify the men they hold.

They still wait for those shallow promises to be filled.

At this very moment there are at least three groups of wives and mothers traveling around the world vainly asking, "Is my husband or son dead or alive?" How cruel it has been that Hanoi has forced these families to undertake such expensive and strenuous travels when the information they seek could be so easily and simply supplied by Hanoi.

When our men ultimately return, I want to be able to look these brave servicemen straight in the eye and be able to say to them that while they were gone, we in the Defense Department did everything possible to demand their proper treatment, to obtain their release, and to assist their families.

Where would our country be if we did not have these brave men who were willing to defend the principles we love, who were willing to risk their lives, to risk being captured while supporting those principles? Here are men who have assumed those risks and who have been captured and we have a responsibility to them.

Before concluding, I would like to step away from our problems for a moment. Life in America today is far from perfect but it still remains the best the world has ever known.

Today we are the strongest and richest nation. We enjoy the highest wages and the shortest workweeks. Through generosity and hard work we have brought more help to mankind than any other civilization in history.

In short, Americans have proved that things could be done, that dreams could be embodied in action and that a better life truly could be achieved provided we were willing to work for it.

No other nation criticizes itself as frequently or as openly as we do in America. In so doing, we publicize our few weaknesses to the whole world and our adversaries are free to distort those weaknesses to their own advantage.

These critics frequently do so. But what they forget is that, as America experiences problems, it solves them. As new problems are faced, as new goals are reached, new goals are set and new problems are solved.

New Electronic System On SAC Airborne Command Post

General Bruce K. Holloway, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, adjusts one of five data display units that make up a part of the airborne real-time electronic data processing system aboard a SAC Airborne Command Post (Looking Glass).

General Holloway was the first flag officer to participate in a "General War Scenario" utilizing this automated data system to assist in command and control of SAC forces.

PACCS ADA (Post Attack Command Control System—Airborne Data Automation) is a one-of-a-kind test bed system installed on a Looking Glass aircraft. It uses miniaturized data automation equipment to store and present real-time force status information, freeing the airborne battle staff of time-consuming hand tabulation.

The system is also capable of assisting in collecting and interpreting information from a variety of sources (radio, teletype, etc.). Of major importance, it assists the battle staff by providing quick, accurate, timely information upon which to make "real-time" decisions. "Impressive—covers a much wider scope of functions than I had imagined—an excellent job," was the description General Holloway had for the system after his two and one-half hour "check ride." SAC operational flight testing has been conducted since January 1970—further tests are scheduled for the next 15 months using a ground to aircraft computer link for automatic updating of the ADA data base.

Future systems incorporating design guidance from the ADA project will enable battle staffs to perform the full spectrum of command and control in an airborne environment.

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